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Ameliorating the Federal Trial Penalty through
a Systematic Judicial “Second Look” Procedure
We can’t lose sight of the fact that when you imprison
somebody for ten years, fifteen years, twenty years, there’s
a human toll that should not be ignored in the process.
And in fact when you put somebody in jail for that length
of time, you take away all hope. And out of that a great
despair arises.
—Judge Theodore McKee,
U.S. Circuit Court Judge1
The sentencing judge is the person who commits prison
beds, determining who goes to prison and for how long.
—Senator Edward M. Kennedy2
Defendants in our criminal justice system today face widely
divergent choices in almost every case. Although they enjoy
the most rights the law extends to any parties appearing
before a court, the trial penalty—the threat of a substantially
more severe conviction or longer sentence after trial than
the one available upon a guilty plea—almost always renders
these protections academic.
As it erases substantive due process protections for
criminal defendants, the trial penalty becomes a key driver
of mass incarceration. Not only does it propel defendants to
accept guilty pleas early in the process (thus freeing pro-
secutors to focus resources on more cases), it is often
operationalized in disproportionately long custodial sen-
tences—sometimes extremely long sentences. Whether
imposed after a rare exercise of the right to trial or, more
commonly, as a result of a plea bargain in the shadow of
a much more severe outcome, these long “trial penalty
sentences” have become the mainstay of U.S. mass
incarceration.
There is no data on how many federal inmates are
serving sentences driven by a penalty that represents an
unduly punitive response to a guilty verdict after trial or
that effectively neutered the defendant’s consent in the
plea process. And it is important to emphasize that not all
long sentences are driven by the trial penalty. Some would
have been imposed regardless of how guilt was adjudi-
cated. Some represent a plea discount—a modest reduc-
tion of the sentence that would have been imposed had
there been a trial. And some represent a plea windfall—
a sentence significantly lower than the charged facts would
justify.
But there is a realization, exemplified in recent statutory
and guideline changes, as well as President Barack
Obama’s clemency initiative, that there are thousands of
federal inmates serving unnecessarily harsh sentences
imposed at a “retail” level after trial or extracted through
onerous plea bargains. To get a sense of the potential
numbers, of the 180,000 or so current federal inmates,
almost 50 percent are serving sentences of 10 years or
more, and almost 30 percent are serving sentences of 15
years or more,3 and unlike the state prison inmate compo-
sition, almost half the federal inmate population is incar-
cerated on drug charges.4
In a September 2017 report, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission estimated that at the end of President
Obama’s presidency, approximately 2,600 federal
inmates—who had been incarcerated at the time the
initiative was announced and were still behind bars
without a grant of clemency when he departed—
appeared to have met the extremely high bar of the
announced factors for his clemency initiative: low-level,
non-violent offenders, with no ties to gangs or cartels,
with 10 years served and a good prison record, and
whose sentences would be lower today by operation of
law or policy.5 To those familiar with the cases of federal
inmates, this 2,600 figure represents the proverbial
tip of the iceberg of those deserving a sentence
modification.
Moreover, behind these statistics of long sentences are
well-documented and deeply troubling racial disparities.6
Even more disturbing, a large number of inmates are
serving sentences that would not be imposed today. Some
sentences were meted out prior to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Booker (which rendered the then-mandatory
sentencing guidelines advisory) or prior to any subsequent
Supreme Court cases that flesh out Booker’s deference to
proportionality and individuation. Some sentences repre-
sent draconian uses of mandatory minimum penalties
recently reduced by the First Step Act, but which were not
made retroactive. Some sentences represent charging and
sentencing priorities that have undergone a sea-change in
recent years as prosecutors, guidelines experts, and judges
absorb the human toll and scientific insights that reveal
just how unduly severe and ineffective these sentences
turned out to be.
This essay focuses on one proposed mechanism for
ameliorating the excessive sentences produced by the trial
penalty: the post-sentencing judicial “second look” at the
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propriety of a particular sentence after the offender has
served a substantial period in prison. Most particularly, it
sketches out what that process could look like at the federal
level, and examines a leading objection to adopting it: that it
is economically prohibitive and would over-burden the
federal court system.
I. The Role of the Trial Penalty in Producing
Disproportionately Long Sentences
Almost eleven million people revolve through the doors of
our jails and prisons each year, which incarcerate about 2.2
million people at any given moment. But the truly devas-
tating and human toll in the “mass” component of our
mass incarceration is in the actual years that people face
and serve. This is true nationally, but especially so at the
federal level, as noted above, with its high proportion of
long sentences. The analysis of the federal inmate land-
scape becomes even more troubling when we consider how
many are drug defendants (almost 50 percent) and the fact
that these are disproportionately concentrated among the
poor, people of color, and those who are mentally ill.7
The National Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers’ Trial Penalty Report (the Report) rightly focuses on
the trial penalty—the gap between the sentence on a guilty
plea and the likely sentence after trial—as a crucial com-
ponent of a criminal justice system characterized by harsh
sentences. As the Report demonstrates, the sentence
after trial in federal cases is at least double the sentence
imposed in cases where the defendant pled guilty, and
as practitioners know, in cases involving mandatory
minimum sentences, recidivist enhancements, or once-
mandatory guidelines, the post-trial sentence can be
much longer.
Consider the case of Derrin Perkins. Arrested by local
police in 1991, unarmed, in possession of only 17 grams of
crack cocaine, he was prosecuted first locally and later fed-
erally for drug distribution by prosecutors seeking his tes-
timony in a street-level crack distribution scheme run in
Perkins’ neighborhood by his childhood friends. A plea
offer of five years was extended to Perkins and several of his
codefendants as long as they all agreed to cooperate against
others. The collective plea bargaining effort failed, and at 26
years of age, Perkins went to trial and was convicted. His
guideline sentence, based on the quantity of drugs distrib-
uted by the larger conspiracy of which he was merely
a lowly player, was mandatory life.8 There was no allegation
that he ever personally carried a weapon or acted violently.
He was sentenced to life in prison.
But even though Perkins’ case represents a stark illus-
tration, the trial penalty ironically has a greater impact in
the 97 percent of adjudicated cases that do not end in an
actual trial, including the cases with unusually long sen-
tences. Again, using an actual case, Raeanna Paxton,
a mother of five, was an unarmed driver for a minor dealer
“in a situation where methamphetamine-addicted indivi-
duals resorted to selling the drug to support their own
addictions.”9 Prosecutors threatened her with a mandatory
life sentence based on her two minor prior drug convic-
tions, for which she had served little or no jail time, unless
she accepted a stipulated sentence of between 21 to 27
years. Faced with spending the rest of her life behind bars,
Ms. Paxton had no choice but to accept that plea offer, and
the judge had no choice but to sentence her to the 21-year
minimum.10
Experiences like those of Perkins and Paxton proliferate
throughout the criminal justice system. Researchers are
finally appropriately focusing on prosecutors and their
charging practices as a causal factor in not only the volume
of prison inmates but also the length of the sentences they
face. Changes are afoot at the pre-sentencing ground level,
through prosecutorial policies and statutory and guideline
amendments. But what is to be done about the individuals
currently serving lengthy sentences in prison, whose mea-
ger review rights dwindle to extinction as their years behind
bars mount?
II. A Systematic Federal Judicial “Second Look”
at Sentences
Acknowledging America’s exceptional and exponential use
of lengthy prison terms over the last 40 years, and the
necessity for restraint in imposing sentences that stretch
through a generation, the drafters of the revised Model
Penal Code (MPC) of the American Law Institute have
included a unique, and ambitious “second look” procedure
for prisoners serving long sentences.11 The proposal,
couched as a “principle for legislation,” would permit an
inmate to apply to a judicial panel or a judicial decision
maker for a sentencing modification after having served
a substantial portion of their prison term and, if unsuc-
cessful in the initial application for a sentencing reduction,
at intervals thereafter. It includes provisions for the
appointment of counsel and for appellate review, as well as
for victim participation in the resentencing.
This section uses the MPC’s “second look” template to
sketch how that process could work in the federal context. It
adopts, for the most part, the main features of the MPC’s
proposal, with specific recommendations for particular
alternatives proposed by the MPC in light of the current
make-up of the federal inmate population and the lessons
we have learned from recent resentencing programs (based
on retroactive statutory and guideline changes, as well as
President Obama’s clemency initiative).
1. A “Second Look” After 10 Years in Non-Violent Cases,
15 in Violent Cases. The MPC proposes 15 served years as
the point at which a “second look” at the original sentence
is authorized (cognizant of the impact on already over-
burdened state court systems if it set a shorter time
period). The MPC, thus, presumes its “second look” pro-
vision focuses on those who have committed “the most
serious offenses and victimizations.”12 I propose that
a federal “second look” program set a shorter term for
non-violent offenses. Unlike the state system, almost half
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the offenders in the federal system are drug offenders, and
as President Obama’s clemency initiative demonstrated,
many are serving sentences that are significantly dispro-
portionate to their actual conduct due mainly to prosecu-
tors’ over-use of lengthy mandatory minimum sentences
and sentencing guidelines improperly pegged to penalties
intended for king-pins. A “second look” provision after 10
years permits an opportunity to reconsider these long
sentences in light of new evidence-based policies, provides
hope to the offenders serving them, and incentivizes and
rewards the profound turn-around that many of these
offenders display after years of substance abuse and
untreated mental illness.
2. Unconstrained by Mandatory Minimum Penalties. To
ensure that the sentence-modification authority is mean-
ingful, it is critical, as proposed by the MPC, that the
enabling legislation permit judges to resentence below any
applicable mandatory-minimum penalties.13 This relief is
consistent with research that links mandatory minimum
sentencing statutes to the shift of sentencing power to
prosecutors and to the rise in prison populations.14 It also
reflects the changing public attitudes to inflexible manda-
tory minimum sentences.15
3. Before the Original Sentencing Judge, Advised by
a Panel of Federal District Judges. The MPC squarely places
the sentencing reconsideration authority in the judicial
sphere, recommending that it be exercised by a judge or
“a judicial panel or other judicial decisionmaker.”16 I pro-
pose a panel of district judges, with one judge (the original
sentencing judge, if available) making the final decision
and imposing the new sentence. Brooklyn Judge Jack
Weinstein described in United States v. Butler how, after
Booker, his district had reinstituted the practice of conven-
ing sentencing panels to advise the sentencing judge,
quoting sentencing scholar Daniel J. Freed’s admonition to
judges “to reason among themselves” about sentencing.17
An advisory panel has several advantages. For example, it
carries the potential to moderate extreme views, pools and
promotes the development of expertise, distributes
responsibility over more than one individual, and helps
reduce disparities in the resentencing process. District
courts could experiment with the make-up of these advisory
panels, choosing, instead of judges, stakeholders from dif-
ferent constituencies, including crime victims and former
offenders.
4. Substantive Resentencing. As proposed by the MPC,
the federal sentence modification procedure should be
a resentencing based on current circumstances. The
inquiry, as the MPC sums up, is “whether, in light of cur-
rent information, the purposes of sentencing . . . would best
be served by completion of the original sentence or a mod-
ified sentence.”18 Obviously, this would include an analysis
of the circumstances of the offense of conviction and all
relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, but it would
also consider the inmate’s prison record, scientific devel-
opments in the understanding of offender rehabilitation
and risk assessment, and society’s evolving views about
criminal policy and sentencing. The U.S. Sentencing
Commission could be tasked with establishing eligibility
criteria and guidelines to ensure uniformity in decision
making. In addition, provisions could be made for this
process to occur without a formal hearing (as happened in
thousands of the cases involving retroactive adjustments in
recent years).
5. Appointment of Counsel. With de novo sentencing, it
is critical that an eligible inmate has counsel. Someone who
has spent over a decade in prison is ill-suited to craft their
own resentencing position, particularly given the kind of
sophisticated analysis necessary to address changed sen-
tencing practices and policies. Because many cases involv-
ing sentence modification may be decided on paper filings
alone, it makes sense to adopt the practice used in most
districts in the context of the retroactive application of
Amendment 782, and appoint the local federal defender to
represent all potentially eligible inmates. These federal
defenders could, in turn, assign cases to one of the 3,700
assistant federal defenders or one of the 12,000 private
“panel” attorneys who accept assignments under the
Criminal Justice Act.19
6. Right to Appeal. As with motions for retroactive
adjustments under the Sentencing Guidelines, inmates
should have a right to appeal the outcome of their sentence
modification motion under a reasonableness standard.
III. The Costs of a Judicial “Second Look” Procedure in
the Federal System
One of the main critiques of a judicial “second look” sen-
tencing procedure is the inevitable burden on the court
system and related re-entry and supervision services. These
concerns are real, given the emphasis on long sentences in
our federal system.
What precisely would be the caseload impact of a sen-
tence-modification procedure on an annual basis at the
federal level? Although just about half of our current fed-
eral prisoners are serving sentences of 10 years or more
and about one-third are serving sentences of 15 years or
more, I could locate no data on how many have actually
served 10 years, such that they would be immediately eli-
gible to apply for a “second look.”20 It would doubtless be
a substantial number, easily in the region of 10 percent of
the current population. Thereafter, one could assume that
an additional several thousand inmates would become
eligible each year.
Needless to say, this would result in a significant initial
increase in court dockets. In addition, the increase would
not be evenly distributed among the 650 or so federal
district judges, since some districts produce more long
sentences than others.21 If this process were to benefit
18,000 inmates in its first year (10 percent of the current
population), that works out, on average, at 28 individual
resentencings per district court judge (and if we factor in
sentencing panels, this means an additional 50 or so
sentencing recommendations per judge). Can our system
handle the magnitude of this endeavor, logistically and
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financially? Recent related experiences indicate that it
can—as long as the undertaking is accompanied by the
employment of additional personnel, quality technological
assistance, and dedicated participants across groups of
stakeholders (judges, prosecutors, probation officers, and
defense lawyers).
First, regarding the financial cost, given the high number
of federal drug inmates serving long sentences, the “second
look” procedure will likely result in reduced sentences for
a large number of inmates, perhaps thousands. The savings
on the costs of custody will be considerable. The Sentencing
Commission estimates that Amendment 782, which retro-
actively lowered the sentences of drug offenders, reduced the
sentences of 31,000 inmates, with an average reduction of 25
months.22 Assuming an annual cost of $29,000 to house an
inmate,23 this resulted in savings of almost $2 billion. A
“second look” program would likely produce similar savings.
Some of these savings could be diverted to fund the mea-
sure’s impact on resources.
Second, the federal court system’s experience imple-
menting Amendment 782, as well as other retroactive
sentencing measures, illustrates its capacity to handle the
administrative challenges of resentencing on a large scale.
District courts reviewed 48,013 cases under Amendment
782, granting reduced sentences in just over 31,000.24
Supreme Court Fellow Caryn Devins has conducted a rich
empirical study of the 782 implementation process, find-
ing that stakeholders reported it was “for the most part,
smooth and orderly,” with judges often working with
“probation officers and representatives from the U.S.
Attorney’s Office and federal defender organizations in
order to create expedited sentencing processes.”25 Judges
usually granted the available sentence reduction in full to
eligible individuals, often on their own motions without
input from any parties. A “second look” program, by
contrast, since it involves substantive resentencing and the
potential for far bigger reductions, will be far more
involved and time-consuming for all concerned. None-
theless, the 782 process reveals the potential for system-
atizing, and to the extent possible, streamlining the
administration of a “second look” program. One could
envisage, for example, collaborative panels of stakeholders
making unanimous sentence-reduction recommenda-
tions for individuals scoring high on a set of “second look”
guidelines, thus freeing time and resources to address
contested determinations.
Finally, the experience under President Obama’s clem-
ency program, which lasted approximately 2.5 years, also
illustrates the capacity of a relatively small number of sta-
keholders in our criminal justice system to prepare, review,
and analyze the cases of large numbers of applicants for
sentence reductions. As the Office of the Inspector General
reported, the Department of Justice (DOJ) made recom-
mendations to the White House on over 13,000 petitions,
resulting in 1,696 inmates receiving clemency. The pri-
mary review work was conducted by the relatively skeletal
staff at the Office of the Pardon Attorney (OPA), which
consisted of 22 staff, supplemented by volunteer part-time
lawyers from other DOJ units and 10 full-time lawyers
detailed to the OPA in April 2016.26 On the defense side,
NACDL reported that Clemency Project 2014, the volunteer
effort by a consortium of defense organizations, succeeded
in screening 36,000 inmates for clemency eligibility and
recruiting and training 4,000 volunteers, ultimately sub-
mitting almost 2,600 individual clemency petitions, each
of which had been reviewed both by panels of screening
attorneys and by the entire 10-member steering commit-
tee—all on a pro bono basis.27
In sum, a “second look” program would be a significant
undertaking, but it is affordable based on the savings from
incarceration costs, and one the federal court system has
the demonstrated capacity to implement systematically.
IV. Conclusion
Judge Jack Weinstein once said that sentencing is the
moment that most clearly reveals the human face of the
law.28 When the sentence stretches into decades, as it did for
Derrin Perkins and Raeanna Paxton, the law’s face can be
sorely lacking in humanity. It is also, as the MPC maintains,
lacking in humility: “It would be an error of arrogance and
ahistoricism to believe that the criminal codes and sentenc-
ing laws of our era have been perfected to reflect only time-
less values.”29 These laws empowered prosecutors to secure
lengthy sentences post-trial or through plea bargains struck
in the shadow of the trial penalty. A systematic judicial
“second look” procedure would restore some decency and
reason to a sentencing system that has consigned too many
people to prison for far too long.
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